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large groups of foreigners permanently reside outside their countries of nationality. The 
economic, cultural, and political integration of these foreigners is one of the pressing 
problems faced by democratic States in both the developed and developing worlds. One 
question is : whether resident non-citizens should be granted the right to vote. The 
answer to this question depends on who belongs to “the people”. In federal and quasi-
federal States with multiple levels of government the further question arises : whether 
“the people” is a homogenous concept that applies uniformly across all levels of 
government. This article contributes to the debate about the right of foreigners to vote 
in democratic States with multiple levels of government, such as, South Africa and 
Kenya. It does so by discussing the German response to the problems mentioned above. 
The dominant view of the German Federal Constitutional Court since the 1990s has 
been that “the people” only includes “German citizens” , and that attempts by lower 
levels of government to extend the right to vote to foreigners from Africa and elsewhere 
are unconstitutional. In this article I explore and critique this conventional view. I then 
present a positive case for the extension of voting rights to resident non-citizens under 
the German Constitution. Many of the arguments would apply with equal force to the 
debate about the right to vote of foreigners in African multi-level democracies, such as, 
South Africa and Kenya. 
Keywords: Denizenship, Citizenship, Voting rights, Nationality law, Multi-level 
government, The people, Foreigners, Residents, Affected persons principle, Democracy.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Abraham Lincoln famously stated that democracy means “government of the people, by 
the people, for the people”.2 It appears that one question remains central to any debate 
about democracy: who are “the people”? Defining “the people” is fundamental. In a 
democracy all power (kratos) derives per definition from the people (the demos) 
through general, direct, free, equal and secret elections.3 This reveals the close 
connection between democracy, the people and the right to vote: those who are 
considered to be part of the people are those from whom State authority derives and 
thus are those who have or should have the right to vote. The stark opposite also 
applies: those who are not considered to be part of the people do not have the right to 
vote.  
This article discusses and critiques the contemporary interpretation of the term 
“the people” in the German Constitution, as interpreted by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) in two notorious judgments dating back to the 1990s.4 In 
 
2 Lincoln A “Gettysburg Address” in Peatman J The long shadow of Lincoln´s Gettysburg Address 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press (2013) at XVI.  
3 See art 38 of the German Basic Law, 1949 or Grundgesetz, 1949 [GG]. See also s 19 of the South African 
Constitution, 1996 (“Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections”), read with the 
preamble (“government is based on the will of the people”) and s 1(d) (“The Republic of South Africa is 
founded on ... universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, [and] regular elections”).  
4 Isensee v Bavaria 1990 BVerfGE 83, 37 [Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990)] and 1990 BVerfGE 83, 60 
[Ausländerwahlrecht II (1990)]. 
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terms of that interpretation, the term “the people” means “the German people” at all 
levels of government.5 The demos is thus exclusively composed of persons with German 
citizenship.6 This interpretation precludes the possibility of granting voting rights to 
foreigners without German citizenship, as any statutory law to that effect would be 
regarded as incompatible with the Constitution.7 To prove the point, an attempt by the 
Land Bremen to introduce voting rights to non-Germans at the local level was declared 
unconstitutional by the Staatsgerichtshof Bremen in 2014, reiterating the FCC’s rulings 
from the early 1990s. This restrictive interpretation of the German Constitution makes 
the prospect of expanding voting rights to non-Germans at any level of government 
appear to be rather slim.  
Identifying the people of a State, in a constitutional sense, with the nationals of 
the State, in a cultural or political sense, is not a  feature unique to  German 
constitutional law. The South African Constitution seems to entrench the same 
restrictive interpretation of “the people” by limiting the right to vote at all levels of 
government to “every adult citizen” of the State.8 Yet, it is necessary to break the 
deadlock in this debate to allow discussion of new democratic approaches in times of 
mass migration, and to lay a new constitutional foundation for the integration of 
foreigners into society. An approach away from formal citizenship could at least partly 
close the gap between those persons permanently subjected to State authority but 
unable to vote. Currently, about 10 per cent of the German population live permanently 
outside the demos.9  
To generate renewed momentum, one must (again) challenge the dominant 
interpretation of the German Constitution dating back to the 1990s: does the 
Constitution really prescribe the meaning of “the people” to mean “the German people”? 
Does the Constitution itself not distinguish intentionally between these two terms? Do 
the social developments and amendments to the Constitution since the 1990s require 
German courts to revisit a stance taken in 1990? To what extent is the term “the people” 
open to a different understanding in a multi-level government? Exploring these 
questions from a German perspective, as I do below, will hopefully contribute to the 
debate about non-citizens’ voting rights in other contexts as well. This issue is gaining 
ever more relevance in times of mass migration in Europe as well as in Africa.  
Especially in multi-level governments, such as, Germany, Kenya or South Africa, 
the devolution of centralised State power raises the question whether the term “people” 
requires a uniform approach at all levels of government? Should the sub-levels of 
 
5 Zimmermann A & Bäumler J “Artikel 116 GG” in Friauf K & Höfling W (eds) Berliner Kommentar zum 
Grundgesetz Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag (2015) at para 4.  
6 As well as so-called ‘Status Germans’ in art 116 para 1 GG, see infra 2.2.5.  
7 Except with regard to European citizens at the local level, see further infra 2.2.1.  
8 See s 19(3) of the Constitution. By contrast the preamble proclaims that “South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, united in our diversity”. This tension can be helpfully explored with reference to the German 
debate about non-citizen voting rights.  
9 It is estimated that about eight million individuals permanently reside in Germany who are not allowed 
to vote, see https://www.br.de/bundestagswahl/wahl-deutscher-pass-100.html. 
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government not be able to follow a broader approach of inclusion of persons subject to 
their authority? Like Germany, both Kenya and South Africa also apply the same voter 
eligibility criteria at all levels of government, thereby restricting the right to vote to 
citizens only.10 The discussion and critique of this assumption in German constitutional 
law thus provides a valuable comparative perspective on a contemporary African 
problem: should the devolution of power still be subject to national criteria of voter 
eligibility, or is there scope at lower levels of government to open the franchise to 
members of the community that have traditionally been excluded, such as resident 
foreigners?  
This article proceeds in two parts. In the first part I argue that the terms “the 
people” and “the German people” are not synonymous within the German Constitution 
and that, in any case, the developments since 1990 mean that the FCC’s reasoning has to 
be reconsidered. The second part of the article considers what would qualify a non-
German for inclusion into “the people” , generally, and at the different levels of federal 
government, in particular. In order to determine the decisive elements, the criteria set 
out in the German Nationality Act are considered.11 The Nationality Act links the rights 
of citizenship to personal, territorial or temporal links to Germany. I argue that an 
approach based on those same criteria, without requiring formal citizenship, allows 
greater flexibility without losing sight of the ideal of democracy as the self-government 
“of the people, by the people, for the people”.  
2 DELINKING “THE PEOPLE” AND “THE GERMAN PEOPLE”  
In the German Constitution the terms “the people” and “the German people” are used on 
different occasions.12 The central norms of democracy stipulate that “all State authority 
is derived from the people”13 and that Parliament should “represent the whole people”14. 
At the Länder level,15 “in each Land, county and municipality the people shall be 
represented by a body chosen in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections”.16 
Despite the fact that in these norms on democracy the term “the people” is used without 
qualification, in German constitutional scholarship and jurisprudence, the term “the 
people” is interpreted to mean “the German people”. This section explores this 
interpretation. It raises several arguments in support of the view that the constitutional 
proclamation that all power derives from “the people” need not be interpreted to only 
 
10 See for a broader comparison between the two States Steytler N & Ghai Y (eds) Kenyan-South African 
dialogue on devolution Claremont: Juta (2015). 
11 An English version is available at: 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/EN/Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz_englisch.pdf?__bl
ob=publicationFile (accessed 11 December 2019).  
12 Eg art 146 GG and the preamble use “the German people”, art 20 paras 2, 28 & 38 GG use “the people”.  
13 Article 20 para 2 GG [emphasis added].  
14 Article 38 GG [emphasis added].  
15 Germany consists of 16 Bundesländer. Although each Land has its own constitution and constitutional 
court, every statute has to be in conformity with the Federal Constitution : see on the German 
constitutional system in general and on the federal system in particular,  Currie DP The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press (1994) at 33-102.  
16 Article 28 GG [emphasis added]. 
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mean “German people”, but could generally be interpreted to include both German 
citizens and persons not holding German citizenship.  
2.1 The dominant understanding of democracy as  representation of “the German 
people” 
Usually, when interpreting a constitution, special emphasis is placed on the 
interpretation of the terms used, especially if they re-appear in different contexts and 
with different content.17 In spite of this basic principle of schematic interpretation and 
perhaps rather counter-intuitively, the FCC interpreted the term “the people” to mean  
“the German people” , thereby suggesting that both terms have the same meaning.  
2.1.1 The Federal Constitutional Court’s decisions in 1990 
The decisions of the FCC in 1990 were concerned with electoral acts in Schleswig-
Holstein18 and Hamburg,19 that granted foreigners the right to vote in local government 
elections.20 The FCC had to decide whether those two electoral acts were consistent 
with the German Basic Law. The FCC’s point of departure was article 28 of the German 
Constitution as it pertained to democracy at the Länder level. This provision stipulates 
that “the people” shall be represented by a “body chosen in general, direct, free, equal 
and secret elections”.21 The question was whether the right of “the people” in article 28 
permitted the extension of voting rights to foreigners at the Länder level. In interpreting 
the term “the people” the Court used the introductory sentence of article 28, which 
reads that the “constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles of a 
republican, democratic and social State governed by the rule of law, within the meaning 
of this Basic Law”22. Hence, whether foreigners could be granted the right to vote at the 
Länder level depended on the meaning of “the people” in article 28 of the Basic Law. 
In this regard, the Court referred to Article 20 of the Basic Law, a provision that 
sets out the constitutional principles applicable to the Federation and the Länder. 
Article 20 states that “all State authority is derived from the people”. The Court argued 
that this provision is not only a statement about the sovereignty of the people but at the 
same time about who “the people” are.23 Without further explanation, the Court went on 
to stipulate that “the people” are the people of Germany.24 In the next step, the Court 
 
17 As an example we may refer to the so-called “Deutschen Grundrechte” ie those basic rights that refer to 
Germans as beneficiaries of the rights and which do not apply to foreigners directly. The difference hinges 
upon the explicit reference to Germans. 
18 BVerfGE 83, 37 [Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990)]. 
19 BVerfGE 83, 60 [Ausländerwahlrecht II (1990)]. 
20 In the Land Schleswig-Holstein citizens from six countries, namely, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, in possession of a residence permit (if required) and who had lived in 
Germany for five years were allowed to vote in local elections; in the Land Hamburg voting rights were 
granted to foreigners with residence permits who had lived in Germany for eight years.   
21 The wording of art 28 paras 1 & 2 GG: “In each Land, county and municipality the people shall be 
represented by a body chosen in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections.” 
22 Emphasis added.  
23 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 53.  
24 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 53.  
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argued that the people of Germany are the German people. Article 116 of the Basic Law 
defines who the Germans are. A German is a person in possession of German citizenship 
or a person formally equated with German citizens as so-called “Status-Deutsche”.25 
Thus, in the view of the FCC, the term “the people” in article 20 refers to the collective of 
Germans unified as “the German people”.26 
Although the three provisions of the Basic Law, articles 20, 28 and 116, are not 
directly linked by the Basic Law itself, the Court inferred a logical link between these 
three provisions, almost as though the one provision would be directly based on the 
other two. The Court subsequently referred to a number of other provisions, such as, 
article 33 of the Basic Law, which is concerned with equal citizenship between Germans, 
article 56 which provides for the oath sworn by the President and members of the 
executive to the “German people”,27 and article 146,28 which refers to the “German 
people”, to support the Court’s approach that provisions that refer to “the people” must 
also be interpreted to mean “the German people”.29 The Court continued to argue, with 
regard to the right to vote, that because State authority is derived from – in the Court’s 
view – “German people”, the right to vote can also only be granted to German citizens.30  
Thus the reference to “German” was implicitly added by the Court to both 
articles 20 and 28 of the Basic Law. It followed that, in the view of the Court, the only 
way to include a person in “the people” at any level of government is to grant that 
person German citizenship.31 The focus of reform, if any is needed, should be the 
nationality law and not electoral legislation. The approach adopted in the early 1990s 
by the FCC is widely supported in Germany.32 
 
25 According to art 116 para 1 GG a “German within the meaning of the Basic Law is a person who 
possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the 
boundaries of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or 
descendant of such person”. The latter category are so called “Status-Germans” who do not hold German 
citizenship but are equated on the basis of their German ethnic origin, see Zimmermann A & Bäumler J 
“Artikel 116 GG” in Friauf K & Höfling W (eds) Berliner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag (2015) at para 40 et seqq. 
26 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 53. 
27 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 55.  
28 Art 146 reads: “This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany 
applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely 
adopted by the German people takes effect.” 
29 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 55. 
30 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 56.  
31 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 56. 
32 Isensee J “Kommunalwahlrecht für Ausländer aus der Sicht der Landesverfassung Nordrhein-
Westfalens und der Bundesverfassung” (1987) KritV 300 at 300; Huber P M “Das ‘Volk’ des 
Grundgesetzes” 1989 DÖV at 531-536; Dederer H-D Korporative Staatsgewalt Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
(2004) at 190 ff; Groß T Das Kollegialprinzip in der Verwaltungsorganisation Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
(1999) at 165 f; Horn H D “§ 22 Demokratie” in Depenheuer O & Grabenwarter C (eds) Verfassungstheorie 
T bingen: Mohr Siebeck (2010) 748 at 754; Grawert R “Staatsvolk und Staatsangehörigkeit” in Isensee J & 
Kirchhof P (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts Band II: Verfassungsstaat Heidelberg: C.F. Müller (2004) at 
§16 para 20; differently, Bleckmann A “Das Nationalstaatsprinzip im Grundgesetz” (1988) DÖV at 437; 
Bryde B O “Ausländerwahlrecht und grundgesetzliche Demokratie” (1989) JZ 257 at 257 ff. 
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None the less, the Court held in an obiter dictum that the Constitution could be 
constitutionally amended to grant European citizens the right to vote at the local level 
within the Länder.33 Two years after the Court handed down its decision, the German 
Basic Law was indeed amended. In 1992, the constitutional lawgiver altered article 28 
to extend, in principle, the right to vote to European citizens at the local level.34 This 
inclusion of Europeans was never challenged before the FCC.35 In the aftermath, all the 
Länder have brought their Constitutions and laws into conformity with European 
requirements granting European citizens the active and passive right to vote at the local 
level36.  
2.1.2. The judgment of the Staatsgerichtshof Bremen 
The amendment to the German Basic Law opened up the voting system at the local 
government level to non-Germans, seemingly implying that at least at the local level, 
“the people” cannot be interpreted as to exclusively mean “the German people”. 
However, in January 2014 the Staatsgerichtshof in Bremen, the Constitutional Court of 
the Land of Bremen, held that the same considerations that applied in 1990 still 
prohibited non-EU foreigners from acquiring the right to vote in local government 
elections.37 The background to the change of the election law was an estimate that also 
about 10 per cent of all persons living in Bremen were barred from voting. The 
government of Bremen decided to extend the right to vote to persons not in possession 
of German citizenship but who permanently resided in Bremen.38  
The judges of the Staatsgerichtshof Bremen found that what applies at the federal 
level also still applies at the lower levels. The allowance for Europeans to vote is a 
formal exception that needs to be interpreted restrictively and not a principled change 
to the understanding of “the people” to mean “the German people” or German citizens.39 
 
33 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 74. 
34 Art 28 para 1 sentence 3: “In county and municipal elections, persons who possess citizenship in any 
member state of the European Community are also eligible to vote and to be elected in accordance with 
European Community law.” 
35 However, the right of European citizens to participate was unsuccessfully challenged at the Länder level 
in Bavaria,  see BayVerfGHE 66, 70; some discuss whether the alteration is unconstitutional in the light of 
the eternity clause of art 79(3) of the Basic Law. Vogelgesang K “Artikel 28 GG” in Friauf K & Höfling W 
(eds) Berliner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag (2015) at Art 28 para 61 et seqq.  
36 Exemplatory reference can be made to § 7 Kommunalwahlgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen that only 
requires that a German citizen or a citizen from the European Union has his or her permanent residency 
in the respective area for the local election 16 days before the election (“Wahlberechtigt für die Wahl in 
einem Wahlgebiet ist, wer am Wahltag Deutscher im Sinne von Artikel 116 Abs. 1 des Grundgesetzes ist 
oder die Staatsangehörigkeit eines Mitgliedstaates der Europäischen Gemeinschaft besitzt, dassechzehnte 
Lebensjahr vollendet hat und mindestens seit dem 16. Tag vor der Wahl in dem Wahlgebiet seine 
Wohnung, bei mehreren Wohnungen seine Hauptwohnung hat oder sich sonst gewöhnlich aufhält und 
keine Wohnung außerhalb des Wahlgebiets hat”).  
37 StGH Bremen, Urteil vom 31. Januar 2014 – St 1/13: Ausweitung des Wahlrechts durch 
Landesgesetzgeber [StGH Bremen (2014) available at 
http://www.staatsgerichtshof.bremen.de/sixcms/detail.php?gsid=bremen02.c.736.de (accessed 11 
December 2019).  
38 StGH Bremen (2014) at 3.  
39 StGH Bremen (2014) at 13-17. 
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The right to vote is accompanied by a set of rights and duties.40 Beyond the exception 
provided for in the amended article 28, the right to participate in elections can only be 
granted to those with citizenship.41 The Staatsgerichtshof Bremen even raised the 
question whether human dignity42 requires consideration, in case a person is 
permanently subject to State authority in Germany.43 The Court avoided an in-depth 
analysis of this question. Instead, it found that the Basic Law is conceptualised in a way 
as to resolve this question by way of the Nationality Act.44 Again, the avenue of reform is 
naturalisation law not electoral law. 
2.2 A critique of the German voting rights jurisprudence  
The critique of the aforementioned interpretation of the German Constitution can be 
developed on several grounds. I list those grounds here for ease of reference and then 
proceed to discuss each in turn in the rest of this part. First, the Constitution 
intentionally distinguishes between “the people” and “the German people”, reflecting 
the fundamental distinction between the  pouvoir constituant and the  pouvoir 
constitué.45 Secondly, since the amendment of the Constitution, “the people” from whom 
State authority derives includes persons not in possession of German citizenship, 
namely, European Union citizens. Thus, “the people” cannot be restricted to those 
holding German citizenship only. Otherwise one would have to conclude that State 
authority is derived from persons outside of “the people”. Upholding the interpretation 
of the FCC would thus lead to an unacceptable contradiction.46 Thirdly, the central 
provision in the Constitution, article 38, concerned with the active right to vote, sets 
limits only with regard to age but not with regard to nationality.47 Thus, the provision 
that would have been most suitable to restrict the right to vote to Germans does not 
provide for a limitation based on citizenship. No other provision in the Constitution, in 
fact, offers a solid basis for the limited approach adopted by the Constitutional Court.48 
Fourthly, “the people” is an open term not restricted to some kind of German Kulturvolk, 
that is, a people restricted to persons of German descent. Since the major reform of the 
Nationality Act in 1999, it is even less convincing to argue that “the people” are limited 
only to those with German citizenship jus sanguinis since other grounds for acquiring 
citizenship have finally been accepted.49 Fifthly, the equal rights of so-called “Status-
Germans”50, meaning persons that do not hold German citizenship but have the same 
 
40 StGH Bremen (2014) at 12. 
41 StGH Bremen (2014) at 12. 
42 Art 1 para 1 GG: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
state authority.” 
43 StGH Bremen (2014) at 13. 
44 StGH Bremen (2014) at 13.  
45 See part 2.2.1 below. 
46 See part 2.2.2 below. 
47 Art 38(2): “ Any person who has attained the age of eighteen shall be entitled to vote; any person who 
has attained the age of majority may be elected.”  
48 See part 2.2.3 below. 
49 See  part 2.2.4 below. 
50 See fn 25 above for an explanation of this term. 
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rights as Germans, offers an example of non-citizens that are granted full citizenship 
rights without naturalization.51 Sixthly, the object and purpose of democracy itself is 
undermined when one limits participation to those holding a certain nationality. 
Understanding the principle of democracy as a maximisation mandate 
(Optimierungsgebot) in fact supports a more progressive approach.52 Finally, the binary 
link between people and citizenship is detrimental to both legislators and the affected 
persons. Resolving the problem exclusively  through naturalisation might not always be 
the most suitable solution and unnecessarily limits the options otherwise available.53  
2.2.1 The distinction between the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir constitué 
The utilization of the terms “the people” and “the German people”, respectively, in the 
German Constitution is based on the fundamental distinction between the constituent 
power (pouvoir constituant) and constituted power (pouvoir constitué).54 While the 
former term refers to the sovereign exercising its constituting power, the pouvoir 
constitué refers to the sovereign as constituted and thus subordinated to the 
constitution. It thereby adheres to the distinction between two different concepts of 
“the people” as the source of power.55 This approach requires us to conceptually 
differentiate between the very creation of the constitution and the exercise of power 
within the framework of the constitution. The pouvoir constituant is pre-eminent to the 
constitution and thus does not have to be identical with the pouvoir constitué that is 
only created by the pouvoir constituant through a transfer of power.56 In general, the 
pouvoir constitué could mean a wider or smaller group of persons than the pouvoir 
constituant.57  
The provisions in the German Basic Law that refer to “the German people” refer 
to the pouvoir constituant, while the term “the people” refers to the pouvoir constitué. 58 
The preamble explicitly refers to “[…], the German people, in exercise of their 
constituent power…”. Emphasis is put on the idea that the Constitution was enacted by 
the German people.59 Article 146 of the Basic Law, in the same vein and as a mirroring 
provision, requires “the German people” to decide on the expiry of the current , and 
creation of a new , constitution.60 Due to the wording used in these framing provisions, 
 
51 See part 2.2.5 below. 
52 See part 2.2.6 below. 
53 See part 2.2.7 below. 
54 Karpen U “Kommunalwahlrecht für Ausländer” (1989) NJW 1012 at 1013.  
55 Unruh P argues that the Constitution consistently reflects the distinction between pouvoir constituant 
and consituté; see Der Verfassungsbegriff des Grundgesetzes Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2002) at 397.  
56 Dederer (2004) at 193; see generally on the pouvoir constituant Hofmann H “Über Volkssouveränität – 
eine begriffliche Sondierung” 2014 JZ at 861-868. 
57 Dederer (2004) at 193.  
58 Karpen (1989) at 1013. 
59 Preamble: “the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law”. 
It does not matter here whether or not this claim is entirely accurate historically. 
60 Article 146 [Duration of the Basic Law]: “This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and 
freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a 
constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect.” 
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it is generally accepted that the “German people” is the pouvoir constituant of the Basic 
Law.61  
It has been argued that, because article 146 is concerned with one aspect of State 
authority and this provision refers to “the German people”, “the people” in article 20 
must be interpreted accordingly.62 Yet, when upholding the difference between the 
pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir constitué, article 146 is a reflection of the power of 
the pouvoir constituant, whereas article 20 is a reflection of the power of the pouvoir 
constitué. While only the pouvoir constituant may have the power to decide on the 
constitution in its entirety, the pouvoir constitué in article 20 does not necessarily refer 
to the same group.63 Thus, the respective provisions do not have to be interpreted in the 
same way as they reflect two different concepts , and functions , of “the people”. 
Moreover, in addition to articles 20 and 146, article 1(2) of the Basic Law, which sets 
out the fundamental obligation to respect human rights and the world order, stipulates 
that “the German people acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the 
basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world”. History explains the 
explicit reference to the German people. From this understanding follows the obligation 
to respect human rights, peace and justice in the world as a commitment even preceding 
the Basic Law itself, binding the pouvoir constituant to this fundamental obligation.64 
Only on one other occasion is reference made to the “German people”. On assuming 
office, the Federal President, the Chancellor and every Minister must swear an oath of 
office dedicating their efforts to the wellbeing of the “German people”.65 Why swear the 
oath for the benefit of the pouvoir constituant? Although these office holders are 
(indirectly) voted into office by the pouvoir constitué, their power, as well as the limits 
of their power, were granted by the pouvoir constituant. They are bound by the 
constitution and even if the pouvoir constitué would demand that certain laws be made, 
any statutory law must conform to the limits set by the Basic Law and thus by the 
pouvoir constituant.66 Indeed, other provisions within the Basic Law concerned with 
State authority and the principle of democracy refer only to “the people”, without the 
qualifying word “German”. Articles 20(2), 21, 28 and 38 all use the term “the people” 
only.67 The “German people” as pouvoir constituant opted for democracy and 
transferred the power to “the people” as pouvoir constitué. The two concepts are not 
identical; a definition of the latter is not logically implied in the former.  
 
61 Dederer (2004) at 172. 
62 Dederer (2004) at 172.  
63 Not very clear in Unruh (2002) at 388.  
64 Dederer (2004) at 172.  
65 Article 56: “I swear that I will dedicate my efforts to the well-being of the German people, promote their 
welfare, protect them from harm, uphold and defend the Basic Law and the laws of the Federation, 
perform my duties conscientiously, and do justice to all. So help me God.” 
66 Article 79 para 3 GG reads: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into 
the Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in 
Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.” These provisions set out the boundaries for any changes to the 
Constitution.  
67 The only other provision referring to the “German people” is art 138 GG which refers to legal provisions 
enacted for the “Liberation of the German People from National Socialism and Militarism”.  
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2.2.2 The inclusion of European citizens: part of “the people” outside “the people”? 
According to the FCC , “the people” is interpreted  to mean “the German people”. Yet, the 
Basic Law in 1992 endowed European citizens with the right to vote at the local level. If 
the two terms “the people” and “the German people” really mean the same, then 
Europeans are allowed to vote as persons outside “the people”. This approach can 
hardly be reconciled with the idea that all State authority must be derived from “the 
people”, according to article 20(2) of the Basic Law as interpreted by the FCC. While the 
local level in Germany is regarded as an expression of self-government, it is generally 
agreed that the exercise of State authority even at the lower levels forms part of State 
authority.68 Thus, even State authority at the local level must derive from “the people” 
and, according to the limited understanding of the FCC, from “the German people”.69 Yet, 
in article 28(1) it is now stated that “[i]n county and municipal elections, persons who 
possess citizenship in any member state of the European Community are also eligible to 
vote and to be elected in accordance with European Community law”. No one claims 
that these voters are Germans if they remain in possession of their French, Greek or 
Romanian citizenship. Is article 28 not consistent with article 20(2) , or is article 20(2) 
wrongly interpreted by the FCC to only refer to the German people? 
One of the main arguments for the dissenting opinion of Judge Sacksofsky in the 
judgment of the Staatsgerichtshof Bremen70 is indeed the change of the Constitution 
since 1990. Since the inclusion of European Union citizens through article 28(1), the 
basis of the FCC judgments from the 1990s has fallen away.71 Article 28(1) leads to a 
contradiction if it allows Europeans to vote at the local level while the term “the people” 
in the Basic Law remains strictly understood to mean the “German people”.72 In order to 
avoid this internal contradiction, it is much more convincing to argue that the term “the 
people” is open-ended at the federal and lower levels of government, and that 
Europeans residents in Germany should, in this sense, be considered part of “the 
people”.73 Hence, while in 1990 article 20 might have inspired the restrictive 
interpretation of article 28, it is now article 28 that requires a change of the 
interpretation of article 20 in order to reconcile otherwise conflicting interpretations. 
One may argue that the local level is altogether different as it is concerned with 
local self-government. Yet, local self-government is also part of State authority.74 The 
 
68 Ausländerwahlrecht II (1990) at para 45; see also BVerfGE 8, 122 at 132; BVerfGE 38, 258 at 270 and 
BVerfGE 47, 253 at 272. 
69 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 53; see also Maunz T & Scholz R “Article 28” in Maunz T & Dürig G 
(eds) Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Lfg. 73 (2014) at para 89.  
70 StGH Bremen (2014), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sacksofsky at 20. 
71 StGH Bremen (2014), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sacksofsky at 21; see also Eickenjäger S & Valle 
Franco A “Ausweitung des Wahlrechts für Migranten? Anmerkung zum Urteil des Bremischen 
Staatsgerichtshofes vom 31.1.2014” (2015) 2 ZAR 52 at 54. 
72 Lenski S-C “Der Bürgerstatus im Licht von Migration und europäischer Integration” (2012) DVBl at 
1057. 
73 On the general requirement to interpret the Constitution without contradictions see Maurer H 
Staatsrecht 6th ed Munich: C.H. Beck (2010) at 23.  
74 Ausländerwahlrecht II (1990) at para 40. 
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main point of the FCC in its 1990 decision was that the homogeneity clause requires 
harmonisation between the interpretation of articles 28 and 20 of the Basic Law. Thus, 
due to the fact that local self-government is also State authority, it is almost inevitable 
that the term “the people” in article 20 must now be interpreted to include people other 
than German citizens if non-Germans are allowed to vote in local government elections. 
The German Constitution should be regarded as “a living instrument”75 that may change 
and develop over time. Developments in Europe since the 1990s requires a re-
interpretation of the term “the people” more than two decades after the 1990 judgment. 
Yet, the majority of the Staatsgerichtshof Bremen argued that the exceptional character 
of article 28(1) rather supports the restrictive interpretation of “the people” still 
prevailing in German constitutional law and scholarship.76 On the contrary, the 
amendment of article 28(1) in 1992 fundamentally changed the nature of this provision 
and of the understanding of the term “the people” in the Basic Law.  
2.2.3 Article 38 of the Basic Law: a meaningful silence?  
Article 38 of the Basic Law is concerned with elections to the German Parliament and 
thus with the right to vote at the federal level. Article 38(2) sets out the preconditions 
for the active (who is allowed to vote) and the passive (who can be voted for) right to 
vote. This would have been the perfect place in the Basic Law to restrict the right to vote 
to German citizens only. However, the provision merely proclaims that to be able to 
vote, a person must be above the age of 18. Thus, according to the Basic Law, the right to 
vote at the federal level could not be granted to persons under the age of 18 .77 As a 
matter of fact, the provision makes no mention of citizenship. The element of age as the 
sole restriction in the Constitution could, as an argumentum e contrario, be seen as an 
indication that the Constitution itself did not intend to predefine who is generally 
eligible to be granted the active right to vote insofar as nationality as a voter eligibility 
criterion is concerned. 
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the right to petition in 
article 17 of the Basic Law is granted to “every person”. The right to participate in the 
political process in Germany by “addressing written requests or complaints to 
competent authorities and to the legislature” is also not restricted to German citizens.78 
The German Basic Law is generally open to the participation of foreigners in the German 
political process. This understanding is supported by a comparative analysis of other 
constitutions around the world.  
A considerable number of constitutions in and beyond Europe indeed expressly 
reserve the right to vote exclusively for their citizens. In the South African Constitution 
in section 19(3), the right to vote is explicitly granted, and arguably limited, to 
 
75 With regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, ECtHR, Tyrer v United Kingdom, (Appl No. 
5856/72) Judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no 26 at para 5. 
76 StGH Bremen (2014) at 15.  
77 Pieroth B “Artikel 38 GG” in Jarass H D & Pieroth B Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Munich: C H Beck Verlag (2014) at 23. 
78 Sieveking K “Kommunalwahlrecht für Drittstaatsangehörige – kosmopolitische Phantasterei‘ oder 
Integrationsrecht für Einwanderer?” (2008) 4 ZAR 121 at 123. 
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citizens.79 This requirement applies to all levels of government : the national (section 
46(1)), provincial (section 105(1)) and local  (section 157(2)). The South African 
Constitution does not provide for  a definition of “citizenship” but only requires that 
Parliament must regulate the acquisition, loss and restoration of citizenship (section 
3(3)). Similar reference to “the people” as being composed of citizens can be found in 
other constitutions in Europe : in Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy.80 In these countries 
foreigners usually are not granted the right to vote. Yet, it is important to note that in 
countries whose constitutions do not restrict “the people” to citizens, the right to vote is 
often granted to foreigners : namely, in Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands and 
Sweden.81 In Spain foreigners can generally be granted voting rights under the 
condition of reciprocity, that is, if Spanish citizens are also granted the right to vote in 
the respective other country.82  
In sum, there is no provision within the German Constitution that explicitly 
confines the right to vote to German citizens, neither in article 38 nor in any other 
provision. Also: in the light of other constitutions, the absence of a clear determination 
that “the people” means the citizens only, it could be interpreted as generally permitting 
the extension of voting rights to non-citizens. 
2.2.4 No restriction to a “German Kulturvolk” and the changing composition of the demos  
Supporters of the “people-equals-German people” interpretation83 often refer to the 
Maastricht Decision in which the FCC proclaimed that even as part of an ever closer 
European Union, it is required that the Member retain substantial political fields of 
action, in which the “relatively homogenous” peoples of Europe, spiritually, socially and 
politically speaking, can express their will in the democratic process.84 However, it is 
quite unclear what the FCC meant when referring to a “relatively homogenous” people 
in this regard. This line of argument does not follow directly from the Constitution nor 
from the Nationality Act.85 
 
79 However, some argue that this is rather a minimum requirement instead of a restriction of the 
possibility to grant the right to foreigners. Yet, currently, the possibility to get enrolled on the national 
common voters roll is provided to South African citizens; see generally on the right to vote,  Le Roux W 
“Migration, representative democracy and residence based voting rights in post-Apartheid South Africa 
and post-unification Germany (1990-2015)” (2015) 3 VRÜ 263. 
80 Max-Planck-Institut “Bericht des Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht, 14. März 1990” in Isensee J & Schmidt-Jortzig E (eds) Das Ausländerwahlrecht vor dem 
Bundesverfassungsgericht: Dokumentation der Verfahren Heidelberg: Müller (1993) 284 at 287 ff. 
81 Max-Planck-Institut (1993) at 296, 309 & 324 et seqq.  
82 Max-Planck-Institut (1993) at 329.  
83 Horn (2010) at 754 para 28; Isensee J “Staat und Verfassung” in Isensee J & Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts Band II: Verfassungsstaat Heidelberg: C.F. Müller (2004) § 15 at 121; Roellecke G 
“Souveränität, Staatssouveränität, Volkssouveränität” in Murswiek D , Storost U & Wolff H (eds) Staat - 
Souveränität - Verfassung Festschrift für Helmut Quaritsch zum 70. Geburtstag Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt 
(2000) 15 ff.  
84 BVerfGE 89, 155 (186) - Maastricht. 
85 See also Lenski (2012) at 1059 et seqq. 
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Very little historical information exists about the choice of the terms “the people” 
and “the German people” in the respective provisions of the Basic Law. Reference is 
often made to the predecessors of the Basic Law that referred to “the German people”,86 
and this interpretation was maintained during the division of Germany, to stress that all 
Germans belong to one united Germany.87 Yet, the general opinion is that the German 
Constitution has no underlying notion of a “German Kulturvolk”, a people restricted to 
the German culture or bloodline. Neither article 16 of the Basic Law (concerned with 
German citizenship) nor article 116 of the Basic Law may be interpreted in a way that 
would restrict the possibility to grant German citizenship to persons who are culturally 
unrelated to Germany.88 
The FCC itself stressed that any changes to “the people” should be made via 
changes to the Nationality Act.89 Indeed, the 1999 reform broadened the circumstances 
under which German citizenship can be acquired. Prior to the reform it was mainly 
German descendants who became German citizens , reflecting the jus sanguinis 
approach. Under the current Nationality Act, persons may acquire citizenship due to 
their own residency in Germany or because they are descendants of permanent 
residents for a certain period of time.90 Thus, a Turkish or Algerian citizen may gain 
German citizenship, becoming a German within the meaning of article 116, if he or she 
so desires, after expiration of a relative short period of eight years, if the other 
preconditions set out in the nationality law are met.91 The notion of “the German 
people” as a “relatively homogeneous” sovereign is undergoing revision under the new 
Nationality Act. By the same token the concept of the “the people” is not restricted to a 
“relatively homogeneous” predetermined group. 
2.2.5 The historic example of “Status-Germans”   
The German Basic Law itself notably contains an example of granting citizen-like rights 
to persons who do not possess German citizenship. Those migrants and expellees who 
came to Germany after World War II were by way of article 116(1) immediately treated 
as though they were German citizens with the same rights and obligations as citizens. 
These migrants are generally referred to as “Status-Deutsche”.92 They were not granted 
German citizenship and were thus not Germans in the formal sense. Yet they have full 
German citizens’ rights, including the right to vote.93 
 
86 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at paras 67-71.  
87 Zimmermann & Bäumler (2015) at para 33. 
88 Wallrabenstein A Das Verfassungsrecht der Staatsangehörigkeit Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft (1999) at 155 ff.  
89 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 56.  
90 See in general Hailbronner K & Farahat A “Country Report on Citizenship Law: Germany, EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory 2015” available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34478/EUDO_CIT_2015_02-Germany.pdf?sequence=1 
(accessed 11 December 2019) 
91 § 10 Nationality Act.  
92 Zimmermann & Bäumler (2015) at paras 40-46  
93 Zimmermann & Bäumler (2015) at para 41. 
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The practice of extending the rights of citizenship under article 116 of the Basic 
Law to non-citizens supports the claim that the extension of voting rights is a political 
rather than constitutional decision. While article 116 refers to persons who could show 
a certain link to Germany, in practice, the requirement of some German roots was rather 
loose. Many persons fled the Soviet Union and South-Eastern European States without 
real knowledge of the German language, let alone knowledge or proof of German culture 
or descent. To grant these people refuge as well as political rights without 
naturalisation was a clear and justified political decision following World War II.94 Here 
is an historical precedent embraced by the German Basic Law where individuals were 
granted the right to vote without first requiring naturalisation. The extensive 
equalisation of “Status-Deutsche” shows that it is possible under the Basic Law to 
include a person in the demos, even though that person is not in possession of German 
citizenship.   
2.2.6. The principle of democracy requires inclusion not exclusion  
One of the founding principles of the German Constitution is that Germany is a 
democratic State. In this regard a founding principle can be understood as an obligation 
that is constantly and progressively developing and thus requires constant adjustment 
in order to achieve the most compatible contemporary understanding. The South 
African Constitution speaks in section 39 in this regard of the duty to “promote” the 
founding values of the constitutional order. This is the understanding of principles as 
optimisation or maximisation mandates (“Optimierungsgebote”) developed by Robert 
Alexy.95 If the principle of democracy is understood as an optimisation mandate, or to 
use the words of Armin von Bogdandy, that societies can be “democratic, more 
democratic and most democratic”,96 then the object and purpose of the principle of 
democracy speaks against restricting the term “the people” to “the German people”.97 
Thus, if the Constitution is by its wording open to an understanding of representation 
either of a smaller or a wider group, an interpretation should opt for the wider meaning. 
In her separate opinion in the Staatsgerichtshof Bremen case, Judge Sacksofsky 
argues that article 28 of the Basic Law requires the inclusion of non-citizens, based on 
the understanding that democracy should further the idea of self-determination.98 
Those affected should be included, founded on the basic consideration of human 
dignity.99 She argues that any unjustified limitation restricts human dignity. Judge 
 
94 Zimmermann & Bäumler (2015) at para 42. 
95 Alexy R Begriff und Bedeutung des Rechts 3rd ed München: Alber (2011) at 130; especially for  the 
principle of democracy see Hain K-E Die Grundsätze des Grundgesetzes Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft (1999) at 159 ff. 
96 von Bogdandy A “Demokratisch, demokratischer am demokratischsten?” in 
Bohnert J , Gramm C , Kindhäuser U , Lege J , Rinken A & Robbers G (eds) Verfassung – Philosophie – 
Kirche. Festschrift für Alexander Hollerbach zum 70. Geburtstag Duncker & Humblot: Berlin (2001) at 363-
384.  
97 See also Schliesky (2004) at 619-620 (“Maximierungsgebot”). 
98 StGH Bremen (2014), Separate Opinion of Judge Sacksofsky at 23. 
99 StGH Bremen (2014), Separate Opinion of Judge Sacksofsky at 24. 
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Sacksofsky does not expressly state whether the constitutional understanding of “the 
people” as “the German people” is correct. She merely argues that the Länder could 
integrate non-Germans if they so wish because article 28 needs to be interpreted 
restrictively in its limiting function. In fact, it could be argued that the principle of 
democracy requires the Länder to have the discretion to promote or optimise 
democratic ideas and approaches in a multi-level government.  
In summary, and to conclude the first part of our discussion, all the arguments 
introduced above suggest that it is not desirable to equate the terms “the people” and 
“the German people” as they are used in the German Basic Law. These arguments range 
from technical issues pertaining to the interpretation of specific articles in the Basic 
Law, to more holistic considerations about democracy as a principle. Whether 
considered individually or in combination, these arguments all support the calls that the 
German FCC revisit and change the foundation of the voting rights jurisprudence it 
developed in the early 1990s.  
3 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND THE VOTING RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS IN 
FEDERAL STATES  
The most important question remains: how can the term “the people” be positively 
defined if it is not equated with “the German people”? Who should be considered to 
form part of “the people”? Who should be granted the right to vote? In the second part 
of this article I argue for a new and different approach to the allocation of voting 
rights,100 and then explore two suggestions. First, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the federal, or national , level of government and lower, or sub-national , levels of 
government. It should be possible to develop different conceptions of “the people” at 
different levels of government.101 Secondly, substantive criteria should be developed, in 
place of formal citizenship, to identify who are entitled to the right to vote and who not. 
These criteria are already contained in the German Nationality Act.102  
3.1 A new approach to the allocation of voting rights 
As seen above, given the FCC’s 1990 voting rights decisions, the only possibility of 
granting individuals full political rights in Germany is by way of naturalisation. This 
considerably limits the political options of legislatures to include non-Germans into 
those who are eligible to vote, as the legislatures in Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and 
Bremen had to discover. Frankly, naturalisation has far-reaching consequences and, 
besides the positive effects for many, might not be an attractive or even a realistic 
option for all.103  
 
100 See part 3.1 below. 
101 See part 3.2 below. 
102 See part 3.3 below.  
103 See eg for the US : Mazzolari F “Determinants and effects of naturalization. The role of dual citizenship 
laws”, Rutgers University, 1 May 2006 available at 
http://www.iza.org/conference_files/MEM2006/mazzolari_f2691.pdf (accessed 11 December 2019). 
 
  LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 24 (2020) 
 
Page | 17  
 
Upon naturalisation, the naturalised persons might be in possession of dual 
citizenship,104 which is not without complications from an international point of 
view.105 The naturalised persons might even have been asked to give up their former 
citizenship - either by the law of the new host State or by the law of the former home 
State.106 Naturalization is a serious step, touching upon  the identity of a person. Many 
permanent residents in fact want to retain their citizenship, even though they live away 
from home for many years.107 Wishing to retain the possibility to return to her home 
country and family one day does not mean that a foreigner who permanently lives and 
works in a German town is not fully committed to Germany as well.  
This truth lies behind article 116 of the Basic Law and the recognition of 
returnees as “Status-Germans”.108 This category enabled the returnees to retain their 
citizenship rights in the States from which they were expelled; these non-citizens were 
treated as though they were Germans, without forcing them to immediately take up 
German citizenship.109 Thus, the approach was chosen to effectively put those persons 
on a par with German citizens in all aspects of life, including civil and political rights, 
without immediately requiring naturalization with all its positive and negative 
consequences.  
3.2 Different approaches to determine who belongs to “the people” and should 
have the right to vote 
In the German Federal State, the decoupling of “the people” and “the German people” 
requires a re-thinking of the term “democracy”, on the one hand, and the 
homogenisation mandate in article 28, on the other hand.110 Indeed, it is an open 
question whether the demos should refer to only those persons holding citizenship , or 
to all those under German State authority, or even to  all those who are equally affected 
by German governmental decisions. 
In the past, the FCC itself supported the idea that democracy serves the “self-
determination of all”,111 in a much more progressive way than in the voting rights cases 
 
104 Münch I Rechtspolitik und Rechtskultur Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag (2011) at 83 ff.; Uslucan 
S Zur Weiterentwicklungsfähigkeit des Menschenrechts auf Staatsangehörigkeit Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 
(2012) at 400 ff. 
105 See on development towards dual nationality Martin D A “New rules on dual nationality for a 
democratizing : between rejection and embrace” (1999) 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal  1.  
106 A persons is still generally required to give up his or her previous citizenship according to § 10 para. 4 
Naturalization Act; exceptions are possible according to § 11 Naturalization Act.  
107 See eg a case in which a Turkish citizen who lost their Turkish citizenship when acquiring German 
citizenship re-applied for the Turkish citizenship six years later and the consequences with regard to the 
German citizenship, Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 08 December 2006, 2 BvR 1339/06. 
108 Antoni M “Artikel 116” in Hömig D (ed) Grundgesetz Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (2013)  
1. 
109 Antoni (2013) 1. 
110 Groß T Das Kollegialprinzip in der Verwaltungsorganisation Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (1999) at 163 ff.; 
Sterzel D “Die Einheit von Grundrechtsidee und Demokratieprinzip des Grundgesetzes” in Blanke T et al 
(eds) Demokratie und Grundgesetz Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (2000) at 156 ff. 
111 BVerfGE 44, 125 at 142 – Öffentlichkeitsarbeit.  
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of the 1990s. In the very decision about non-citizen voting rights, the Court still 
proclaimed that, generally, congruence between being subordinated to State authority 
and possessing political rights is desirable.112 In its decision on the voting rights of 
Germans who live abroad, the FCC stressed that the main consideration behind the right 
to political participation is the ability to participate in public dialogue.113 The persons 
that elect the government should be able to discuss and exchange political ideas.114 In 
her separate minority opinion, Judge Lübbe-Wolff elaborated on the requirement of a 
common responsibility shared equally by all citizens.115 In her opinion, the main test for 
inclusion in the people and the electorate is whether a person has to bear equal 
responsibility for the political decisions of the elected government.116 Constitutional 
scholars often argue that the demos should include those who are directly or equally 
affected by a political decision.117 Lenski suggests that persons sharing the same issues 
and concerns and who are therefore all affected by decisions of the government should 
be allowed to vote for that government.118 It has also been suggested that, in place of the 
traditional perception about national identity and citizenship, the focus in determining 
“political citizenship” (regardless of formal citizenship) should be on public welfare.119  
Bauböck ties all of this together by arguing that democratic inclusion requires a 
consideration of all these aspects ( ranging from having a stake in the outcome of the 
election, being affected by the outcome of the election, to being subject to the 
jurisdiction of the elected government ), and that these considerations vary in 
importance at different levels of government.120 
3.3 The absence of a homogenous “people” in multi-level governments  
Turning to the German Constitution again, article 28 is generally understood to require 
homogeneity between the federal or national level of government and all lower or sub-
national levels of government, thus guaranteeing democracy at all the different levels.121 
 
112 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 56; this aspect is particular stressed by Bryde BO “Das 
Demokratieprinzip des Grundgesetzes als Optimierungsaufgabe” in Blanke T et al (eds) Demokratie und 
Grundgesetz Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (2000) at 63. 
113 Germelmann argues that due to modern forms of communication persons can also take part, even if 
they live abroad : see Germelmann C F “Das Wahlrecht von Auslandsdeutschen im Lichte globaler 
Kommunikations- und Aufenthaltsgewohnheiten” (2014) Jura 310 at 310-322. 
114 BVerfGE 132, 39 at para 40 [Wahlberechtigung Auslandsdeutschen (2012)]; this of course reminds us 
of Habermas‘s discourse theory in Habermas J Faktizität und Geltung 4th ed Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
(1994) at 625 ff. 
115 Wahlberechtigung Auslandsdeutschen (2012), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff at para 73.  
116 Wahlberechtigung Auslandsdeutschen (2012), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff at para 73.  
117 Bryde (2000) at 59; Bryde BO “Ausländerwahlrecht und Grundgesetzliche Demokratie” (1989) 44 JZ at 
257; Le Roux (2015) at 276. 
118 Lenksi (2012) at 1062.  
119 Lenski (2012) at 1063.  
120 Bauböck R Democratic inclusion: a pluralistic theory of democratic citizenship at 23 available at 
http://www.law.uvic.ca/demcon/papers/Victoria-Democratic-Inclusion-Part1.pdf (accessed 11 
December 2019).  
121 Kichhof F “Art 83 GG” in Maunz T & Dürig G (eds) Grundgesetz-Kommentar  Munich : C H Beck Verlag 
(2015) Rn. 31. 
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The exact scope of this obligation is open to much debate. It is generally understood that 
“the people” at the Länder and lower levels have to be partly identical to “the people” at 
the federal level.122 The people of the Länder must, to coin a metaphor, always be a slice 
of the same cake as the people at the national level. 
However, this identity of the people throughout the State is based on a 
misperception or an “identity illusion”. Even under the current interpretation of the 
Basic Law and electoral legislation, the people who are allowed to vote at the lower 
levels of government are not entirely identical with the people who are allowed to vote 
at the federal level. First, as mentioned above, European citizens are already allowed to 
vote at the local government level. Secondly, some Länder allow persons to vote at the 
age of 16, while at the federal level the minimum voting age is 18.123 Thirdly, Germans 
that live abroad and are not resident in one of the Länder are not allowed to vote at the 
lower levels if they are not registered in any German town, but can still vote at the 
federal level. Thus, different considerations already govern the question of who is 
eligible to vote at the different levels of government. 
As a matter of fact, the demos is currently, and increasingly, a “wobbly mass” that 
never has any sharp contours, in the sense that there is certainty about who is an active 
member of “the people” and who is not. There is no indicator to determine whether 
anyone will make use of their right and vote in the next elections. The FCC itself has 
stressed that “the people” is not a static and unchanging entity.124 In fact, in today’s 
world, people move between cities within Germany, in the European Union, and around 
the world.125 At any given point in time, “the people” from whom State authority 
derives, might include other people at the local, Länder or federal levels, depending on 
who currently resides in Germany and in which of the respective Länder, who 
successfully applied for German citizenship, who is on holiday and forgot to vote 
beforehand, who does not wish to exercise the right to vote, or who has left Germany 
permanently.  
Expatriate Germans who permanently reside outside of Germany are especially 
supportive of the notion that “the people” is an open rather than closed concept. 
Although those Germans not residing in Germany generally belong to the category of 
“German people”, they must live in Germany for at least three consecutive months in 
order to have the right to vote.126 Thus, whether they belong to the demos or not 
 
122 Jarass/Pieroth GG 14 Auflage Munich : CH Beck (2016)  art 28 & para 10.  
123 At the local level this is the case in Baden-Württemberg, Northrhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg Western Pomerania and Berlin; at the local and Länder levels in Bremen, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Brandenburg.  
124 Ausländerwahlrecht I (1990) at para 56. 
125 Lenski (2012) at 1060.  
126 § 12 Bundeswahlgesetz grants the active right to vote to  persons over the age of 18, who have had a 
place to live in Germany for three months , and are not excluded from the right to vote in terms of § 13. 
According to para 2 a person is also allowed to vote although they  live outside Germany if he or she had 
lived in Germany for three consecutive months  (above the age of 14 and not longer than 25 years ago) or 
is for other reasons personally and directly familiar with the political circumstances in Germany and 
affected by it ; see also BVerfGE 132, 39.   
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depends not on their nationality but on an active decision whether to reside in Germany 
for a relatively short period of time or not. 
In a federal State, the independence and inter-dependence of the levels of 
government are definitive of the character of the State. The Basic Law provides for a 
certain minimum of homogeneity between the federal and the Länder levels, without 
defining the exact contours of this homogeneity. Over and above this minimum 
requirement, the federalist structure allows Länder to diverge from the federal 
approach. The homogeneity requirement should thus rather be interpreted restrictively 
when it comes to voting rights. Room should be provided for the different approaches 
adopted in the Länder, at least at the local level. If the FCC had not been so strict in 1990, 
different Länder could have used their own experiences to contribute to the discussion 
on how integration of foreigners can be achieved effectively and thoughtfully without 
naturalisation.  
3.4 Criteria other than citizenship for granting the right to vote to foreigners  
In 1999 the coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens (Bündnis 90/die Grünen) 
undertook a major reform of German nationality law. As in most democracies, German 
citizenship can be acquired on three grounds: descent as a direct personal and ethnic 
connection with the German bloodline (jus sanguinis); territorial connection (qualified 
jus soli); and duration of residency (time). The granting of citizenship confirms officially 
that one or more of the respective grounds have been met and that a person thus 
formally belongs to the German people. 
A personal nexus to Germany by descent is most apparent with regard to 
expatriate Germans who live abroad. At the federal level, all those in possession of 
German citizenship are currently allowed to vote. These persons have a very general 
and very strong personal link to Germany. According to section 2 of the German 
Electoral Act (Wahlgesetz), to acquire the right to vote, it is merely required that 
expatriate Germans have lived in Germany for three consecutive months after turning 
14. Even if they do not fulfil this requirement, they may still argue that they are 
particularly affected by decisions taken in Germany and on that basis acquire the right 
to vote.127  
A modern understanding of political participation should be based on the 
elements that secure an active and relatively permanent link between participants and 
the government of Germany. In order to broaden the understanding of “the people” over 
and above the formal possession of citizenship, the elements already present in 
naturalisation legislation could be applied without the need to acquire formal 
citizenship. The fact that a person is permanently and actively connected to the 
government of a State, is the main ground why foreigners without citizenship should be 
 
127 § 12 Wahlgesetz (see fn 126 above) suggests a certain understanding of “Betroffenheits-“ with regard 
to Germans living abroad. 
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regarded as belonging to “the people”. Such persons are usually referred to as residents, 
and their participation as based on their “denizenship”.128  
If the term “the people” conceptually and constitutionally allows integration of 
non-citizens, as argued in this article, those residents that fulfil the requirements of the 
Nationality Act should be regarded as eligible to vote, even without naturalisation. 
Doing so would allow the political integration of all those who permanently reside in 
Germany while they live in Germany, without requiring naturalisation, on the one hand, 
and without excluding those permanently subordinated to State authority, on the other 
hand. A foreigner, who has been resident in Germany for more than eight  years would 
therefore be able to vote without applying for and obtaining citizenship,129 provided 
that they provide sufficient evidence of their ongoing residence (such as, official 
registration as a resident of the town where he or she lives and works).  
It is no longer convincing to argue that those who do not want to acquire German 
citizenship also do not deserve to have the right to vote. Permanent residents or 
denizens are indeed affected by decisions of the government, similarly to German 
citizens; they can take part in the political dialogue and bear the responsibility for 
governmental decisions. Therefore, they should be allowed to take part in the political 
discourse and elections.130 They already have the same obligations as German citizens 
to pay taxes and to obey  the laws. They are equally affected by decisions of German 
authority, be it about traffic regulations, shop opening hours or tax increases. The 
famous battle call of the American revolution already demanded: “no taxation without 
representation”.131 
With regard to those who argue that foreigners should not be allowed to vote 
because they can always leave and so escape any further responsibility for 
governmental decisions, the same consideration holds true with regard to foreigners 
who were granted German citizenship. A person in possession of her former citizenship 
can always return to his or her home country and thereby evade the responsibility of 
electoral outcomes, or even vote from abroad once citizenship is granted. Moreover, 
German citizens can also emigrate. German expatriates retain the right to vote in federal 
 
128 Bast J “Denizenship als rechtliche Form der Inklusion in eine Einwanderungsgesellschaft” (2013) 10 
ZAR 353 at 353. 
129 Of course, to become a German by way of time and place of residence, further material preconditions 
have to be fulfilled after eight years. However, the right to vote should be acquired after complying with 
the formal requirement of eight years’ residence. The right to vote while resident in Germany is still 
different from the right to return to Germany in the future having previously resided there. Citizenship as 
opposed to denizenship includes this right to return as an essential element.  
130 A very general development can be observed that the differences between citizens and foreigners are 
diminishing; cf Gärditz K F “Der Bürgerstatus im Lichte von Migration und europäischer Integration” 
VVDStRl 72 (2013), S 49-163 (87 ff); Thym D “Freizügigkeit in Europa als Modell? EU-Migrationspolitik 
zwischen Offenheit und Abschottung” (2011) EuR at 487; Benhabib S “Die Dämmerung der Souveränität 
oder das Aufstreben kosmopolitischer Normen? Eine Neubewertung von Staatsbürgerschaft in Zeiten des 
Umbruchs” in Kreide R & Niederberger A (eds) Transnationale Verrechtlichung Frankfurt: Campus Verlag 
(2008) 209 at 216; di Fabio U Der Verfassungsstaat in der Weltgesellschaft Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2001) 
at 51 ff & 67 ff. 
131 Bryde (2000) at 64.  
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elections but do not have to bear responsibility for the electoral outcome as they do not 
reside in Germany. 
The counter-argument that foreigners who have not become naturalised may not 
be sufficiently integrated, also does not speak against granting non-citizens the right to 
vote . First, Germans also do not have to fulfil any material conditions, such as, proving 
knowledge of German political parties or the German Constitution. The right to vote in 
Germany is altogether a formal right. To argue that foreigners might not be sufficiently 
politicised and therefore may not vote is discriminatory. In addition, the mere fact that a 
person would register in order to vote already indicates that he or she  is at least willing 
to integrate and is interested in entering into the political dialogue in Germany. In 
comparison to German citizens, a foreigner would have to be proactive and  register for 
the election; thus already showing his or her willingness and engagement. These 
foreigners would enter the political dialogue,132 and would indeed prove their 
willingness to take responsibility for the res publica in Germany.133  
4 CONCLUSION 
Democracy means power to the people, but it is not always clear who belongs to “the 
people”. The question has become pertinent in an age of migration where large groups 
of foreigners permanently reside outside their countries of nationality. The economic, 
cultural, and political integration of these foreigners is one of the pressing problems 
faced by democratic States in both the developed and developing worlds. One question 
that arises is whether resident non-citizens should be granted the right to vote. The 
answer to this question depends on who belongs to “the people”. In federal and quasi-
federal States with multiple levels of government the further question arises whether 
“the people” is a homogenous concept that applies uniformly across all levels of 
government.  
This article sought to contribute to the debate about the right of foreigners to 
vote in democratic States with multiple levels of government, such as, South Africa and 
Kenya. It did so by discussing the German response to the problems mentioned above. 
The dominant view of the German FCC since the 1990s has been that “the people” only 
includes “German citizens” and that attempts by lower levels of government to extend 
the right to vote to foreigners from Africa and elsewhere is unconstitutional. In this 
article I explored and critiqued this conventional view. I argued that the attempt to link 
“the people” to “German citizens” as the basis of democracy is too formal and too static. 
Nonetheless, it took a great deal of effort  to decouple these two terms as it is widely 
presumed that the term “the people” in the German Basic Law means “the German 
people”. This interpretation makes it impossible to grant foreigners voting rights.  My 
main argument was that the German Constitution does not link these terms as 
inevitably and inseparably as is usually argued. It is much more convincing to interpret 
the terms “the people” and “the German people” in their respective settings in the Basic 
Law itself. Doing so revealed three things: first, the Constitution does not define who 
 
132 BVerfG 132, 39 – Auslandsdeutsche, para 40. 
133 Wahlberechtigung Auslandsdeutschen (2012), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff at para 71. 
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“the people” are and does not restrict the active right to vote to Germans; secondly, non-
Germans were already included in “the people” when voting rights were extended in 
1992 to Europeans to vote in local government elections, and even earlier to so-called 
“Status Germans”; and thirdly, the Constitution proclaims Germany to be a democracy, 
requiring us to strive towards better fulfilment of this fundamental principle.  
The exclusion of large groups of residents from political participation based on 
their nationality is unhealthy for any democratic State. Democracy demands a 
congruence between the government and the governed or those who are subordinate to 
State authority. Granting the right to vote to foreigners would further the integration of 
non-citizens without demanding that everyone first go through the process of becoming 
a formal citizen with all the negative emotional and legal consequences that might be 
attached. The argument for the inclusion of resident foreigners in the demos and 
extending voting rights to them is strengthened by the character of Germany’s multi-
level government. The federal nature of the State makes it possible for integration to 
take place differently at the different levels of government, allowing for voting rights to 
foreigners at the lower levels of government while restricting the right to vote at the 
national or federal level to citizens. 
The argument presented above focused at times on the technicalities of German 
constitutional law but have wider relevance. If the case I make for the delinking of 
voting rights and citizenship in Germany is valid, many of the same arguments would 
apply with the same force to the debate about the right to vote of foreigners in African 
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